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Abstract—Existing electricity market designs assume risk
neutrality and lack risk-hedging instruments, which leads to
suboptimal market outcomes and reduces the overall mar-
ket efficiency. This paper enables risk-trading in the chance-
constrained stochastic electricity market by introducing Arrow-
Debreu Securities (ADS) and derives a risk-averse market-
clearing model with risk trading. To enable risk trading, the
probability space of underlying uncertainty is discretized in a
finite number of outcomes, which makes it possible to design
practical risk contracts and to produce energy, balancing reserve
and risk prices. Notably, although risk contracts are discrete,
the model preserves the continuity of chance constraints. The
case study illustrates the usefulness of the proposed risk-averse
chance-constrained electricity market with risk trading.
I. INTRODUCTION
Uncertain renewable energy sources (RES) challenge the
efficiency of existing wholesale electricity markets, which
still lack risk-hedging financial instruments, [1]. As a result,
electricity markets are incomplete with respect to uncertainty
and risk, i.e. it does not provide market participants with a
mechanism to secure their positions relative to all probable
future states of the system. In [2]–[5], we developed a chance-
constrained stochastic electricity market design, which inter-
nalizes the RES uncertainty and produces uncertainty-aware
electricity prices that support welfare efficiency, revenue ade-
quacy and cost recovery. However, this market design is risk-
neutral and ignores risk perceptions (preferences) of market
participants, which leads to suboptimal market outcomes.
Although common in the fields of stochastic optimization
[6] and finance [7]–[9], the notion of risk aversion has only
recently gained attention in power system operations and
electricity markets. For example, Sopasakis et al. [10] and
Hans et al. [11] developed risk-averse control strategies for
decentralized generation resources, and Kazempour et al.
[12] explored the effects of risk-averse electricity producers
in a two-stage market equilibrium. However, while hedging
market outcomes against risk using the conditional value-
at-risk (CVaR), [10]–[12] do not allow for risk trading. On
the other hand, Ralph and Smeers [13], [14] demonstrated
in a layout reminiscing wholesale electricity markets that risk
trading using Arrow-Debreu Securities (ADS) results in a risk-
complete market design and the resulting risk-aware prices
can be related to risk-neutral market outcomes. Motivated by
[13], [14], Philpott et al. [15] extended the ADS trading to a
multi-stage scenario-based stochastic market and showed the
existence of a risk-averse competitive equilibrium, if all market
participants are endowed with a coherent risk measure. Ge´rard
et al. [16] applied the result from [15] to a two-stage stochastic
electricity market and showed that a risk-averse equilibrium is
not unique. In line with [15], [16], Cory-Wright and Zakeri
[17] demonstrated that different risk perceptions of market
participants may encourage them to act strategically, thus
causing suboptimal market outcomes, which can be eliminated
if the electricity market is completed with risk trading.
Departing from scenario-based stochastic programming
used in market designs in [12], [15], [16], [18]–[20], this paper
explores risk trading in the chance-constrained electricity mar-
ket proposed in [2]–[5] by introducing ADS. Since the chance-
constrained approach does not require pre-defined scenarios,
the paper shows that infinite-dimensional ADS instruments
can be discretized to design practical risk contracts for a
given set of uncertain outcomes, thus making the market risk
complete. Finally, this paper derives a risk-averse equilibrium
and analyzes risk-averse market outcomes.
II. CHANCE-CONSTRAINED ELECTRICITY MARKET
Consider a chance-constrained electricity market as in [2]–[4].
Let N , G, U be sets of nodes, conventional generators, and
RES. The market operator solves the following optimization:
min
pG,i,αi
F0
[∑
i∈G
ci(pG,i(ω))
]
(1a)
s.t. pU,i(ωi) = pU,i + ωi ∀i ∈ U (1b)
pG,i(ω) = pG,i − α>i ω ∀i ∈ G (1c)
(δ+i ) : P[pG,i(ω) ≤ pG,i] ≥ 1− g ∀i ∈ G (1d)
(δ−i ) : P[pG,i(ω) ≥ pG,i] ≥ 1− g ∀i ∈ G (1e)
(θ) : P[F (pG(ω), pU (ω), pD) ∈ F ] ≥ 1− f (1f)
(λi) : pG,i + pU,i + pi(F ) = pD,i ∀i ∈ N (1g)
(χu) :
∑
i∈G
αi,u = 1 ∀u ∈ U , (1h)
where (1a) minimizes the system operating cost evaluated by
measure F0 (e.g. expectation, if F0 ≡ E) over the random
vector of RES forecast errors ω = [ωi, i ∈ U ] and given
the cost function of each generator ci(pG,i). Eq. (1b) models
the uncertain RES power output pU,i(ωi) at node i as the
RES forecast pU,i plus the RES forecast error ωi. Eq. (1c)
defines the power output of conventional generators under
uncertainty pG,i(ω) using an affine control policy, where
pG,i and αi = [0 ≤ αi,u ≤ 1, u ∈ U ] are decisions for
the scheduled power output and the vector of participation
factors for balancing reserve of generator i. Note that αi,u
denotes the participation factor of generator i in response to
the RES forecast error at node u ∈ U . Chance constraints (1d)
and (1e) ensure the power output of conventional generator
i under uncertainty does not exceed the upper or lower
limits pG,i and pG,i with a probability of 1 − g . Similarly,
(1f) ensures that DC power flows computed using function
F (pG,i(ω), pU,i(ω), pD,i), which maps net nodal injections in
power flows, are contained in a convex set of feasible power
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flows give by F with a probability of 1− f . Finally, (1g) is
the nodal power balance constraint given the nodal demand
and power flow injections pD,i and pi(F ). Eq. (1h) ensures
balancing reserve sufficiency to mitigate ω. Greek letters in
parentheses in (1d)–(1h) denote dual multipliers.
A. Deterministic Reformulation
Assuming that ci(pG,i) is quadratic:
ci(pG,i(ω)) = c2i(pG,i(ω))
2 + c1ipG,i(ω) + c0i, (2)
where c2i, c1i, c0i are cost coefficients, and using F0 ≡ E
and ω ∼ N (0,Σ), where Σ is the covariance matrix of ω,
the optimization in (1) has a tractable convex (second-order
conic) reformulation, [21]:
min
pG,i,αi
spG,i
∑
i∈G
ci(gi) + c2i
∥∥∥α>i Σ1/2∥∥∥2
2
(3a)
s.t. (ζi) : spG,i ≥
∥∥∥α>i Σ1/2∥∥∥
2
(3b)
(δ+i ) : pG,i + z1−gspG,i ≤ pG,i ∀i ∈ G (3c)
(δii) : − pG,i + z1−gspG,i ≤ −pG,i ∀i ∈ G (3d)
(θ) : F˜f (pG, pU , pD, α) ≤ 0 (3e)
(λi) : pG,i + pU,i + pi(F˜f ) = pD,i ∀i ∈ N , (3f)
(χu) :
∑
i∈G
αi,u = 1 ∀u ∈ U , (3g)
where z1− = Φ−1(1− ) is the quantile function of the
standard normal distribution and spG,i is an auxiliary decision
variable modeling the standard deviation of pG,i(ω). (Note
that less restrictive distribution assumptions could be invoked
on ω, see [3]). Function F˜f (·) in (3e) maps the decision vari-
ables, parameters, statistical characteristics of ω and security
threshold f into a vector of security adjusted power flows,
i.e. power flows with security margins so that enforcing (3e)
is equivalent to enforcing the original chance constraint in (1f).
B. Equilibrium Formulation
The optimization problem in (1) and (3) represents a risk-
neutral market operator and has been proven to yield energy
and balancing reserve prices λi and χu, which solve the
following equilibrium, [2]–[4]:{
maxpG,i,αi
spG,i
λipG,i + χ
>αi − E[ci(pG,i(ω))]
s.t. (3b)–(3d)
}
, ∀i ∈ G
(4a)
0 ≤ pG,i + pU,i + pi(F )− pD,i ⊥ λi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N (4b)
0 ≤
∑
i∈G
αi,u − 1 ⊥ χu ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U (4c)
0 ≤ −F˜f (pG, pU , pD, α) ⊥ θ ≥ 0 (4d)
where (4a) is a profit maximization solved by each producer
and (4b)–(4d) are the market-clearing conditions. As shown in
[2]–[4], λi and χu can be interpreted as equilibrium energy
and reserve prices.
III. RISK-AVERSE CHANCE-CONSTRAINED
ELECTRICITY MARKET
The optimization in (4a) solved by each producer is risk
neutral because it assumes average (expected) outcomes of
random ω. In practice, however, producers are likely to hedge
against the risk of uncertain costs based on their risk per-
ception. This section considers risk-averse profit maximizing
producers endowed with a risk measure Fi.
A. Coherent Measures of Risk
Intuitively, a risk measure evaluates an uncertain outcome
Z in terms of an equivalent deterministic outcome F[Z] so
that a producer endowed with risk measure F is indifferent
between accepting uncertain Z or its certainty equivalent F[Z].
Additionally, a risk measure is called coherent if, [7], [9]:
(i) F[c] = c, i.e. the certainty equivalent of a deterministic
constant c ∈ R is equal to the constant,
(ii) F[cZ] = cF[Z], i.e. an uncertain outcome Z scaled by
some positive constant c > 0 is equal to the scaled
certainty equivalent,
(iii) F[(1− c)Z+ cY] ≤ (1− c)F[Z] + cF[Y] for c ∈ [0, 1],
i.e. the risk measure is convex, and
(iv) F[Z] ≤ F[Y] if Z 4 Y, i.e. the risk measure is monotone.
The expectation operator E used to obtain (3a) fulfills (i)–(iv)
and is, therefore, a coherent measure of risk, [9]. However,
E neglects all information on the volatility of the outcome
leading to its common interpretation as a risk-neutral measure.
Any coherent risk measure can be expressed as, [9], [22]:
F[Z] = sup
P∈D
EP[Z] (5)
where D denotes the risk set (risk envelope) of F, i.e. a com-
pact and convex set of probability measures, and EP is the ex-
pectation over the probability measure P. Risk set D uniquely
defines F and can be structured such that supP∈D EP[Z] is
identical to specific risk measures, e.g. CVaR, [9].
Remark 1. Defining a risk measure in terms of a worst-
case probability distribution as in (5) is structurally identical
to distributionally robust optimization that can be applied to
chance constraints (1d)–(1f), see e.g. [3]. This work, however,
focuses on the evaluation of the objective function.
B. Risk-Averse Profit Maximization
To derive a risk-averse modification of (3), we define a risk
set using a moment ambiguity set, [23], which generally yields
tractable convex optimization problems. For example, it can
be implemented by restricting all distributions in a given set
to share the same moments, [24], or to have their moments
in a given closed set, [25]. Accordingly, the risk set of each
producer i can be defined as:
Di = {P(ω) ∈ P | EP[ω] = 0,VarP[ω] ∈ Si}, (6)
where P is the set of probability distributions and Si =
{Σ1, ...,ΣK} is the set of K covariance matrices (Σ1, ...,ΣK),
where K is the same for all producers.
The notable feature of risk set Di is that it represents a
finite set of continuous distributions as opposed to discrete
polyhedral probability measures in [15], [16], which capture a
given set of pre-described scenarios. Hence, using (5) and (6)
yields:
min
pG,i,αi
sup
P∈Di
EP[ci(pG,i(ω))]
= min
pG,i,αi
ci(pG,i) + sup
k=1,...,K
c2i
∥∥∥α>i Σ1/2k ∥∥∥2
2
.
(7)
Although Di as defined in (6) is non-convex, solving (7)
is equivalent to solving the following problem with convex
polyhedral set S˜i = conv(Si), [26, Section 6.4.2]:
min
pG,i,αi
ci(pG,i) + sup
Σk∈S˜i
c2i
∥∥∥α>i Σ1/2k ∥∥∥2
2
(8)
and we can define:
D˜i = {P(ω) ∈ P | EP[ω] = 0,VarP[ω] ∈ S˜i} (9)
as the convex counterpart of Di, which yields the following
coherent risk measure:
Fi [ci(pG,i(ω))] = sup
P∈D˜i
EP[ci(pG,i(ω))]. (10)
Using the epigraph form of (8), each producer now solves
the following risk-averse profit maximization problem:
max
pG,i,αi
λipG,i + χ
>αi − ti (11a)
s.t. (3b)–(3d) (11b)
(ηi,k) : ti ≥ ci(pG,i) + c2i
∥∥∥α>i Σ1/2k ∥∥∥2
2
∀Σk ∈ Si. (11c)
Hence, the risk-averse modification of (3) is:
min
pG,i,αi
spG,i ,ti
∑
i∈G
(ci(pG,i) + ti) (12a)
s.t. (3b)–(3g) (12b)
(ηi,k) : ti ≥ c2i
∥∥∥α>i Σ1/2k ∥∥∥2
2
∀Σk ∈ Si, ∀i. (12c)
Remark 2. Unlike in (4a), the risk-averse profit maximization
in (11) allows different producers to have different perceptions
of the system uncertainty, which can be modeled as different
risk attitudes drawn from producer-specific set Di.
IV. RISK TRADING IN THE CHANCE-CONSTRAINED
ELECTRICITY MARKET
If producer i is endowed with coherent risk measure Fi given
by risk set Di and seeks to maximizes its risk adjusted profit
as in (11), it will lead to suboptimal market outcomes because
(12) is incomplete with respect to risk. This section describes
an approach to complete the chance-constrained market with
respect to risk by introducing ADS trading.
A. Continuous Risk Trading
ADS as introduced in [27] is a common security contract that
depends on the outcome of an uncertain asset, which in the
case of the chance-constrained electricity market in (12) is
the RES forecast error given by ω. Specifically, a buyer of
the contract pays price µ(ω) to receive a payment of 1 for
a pre-defined realization of ω. Hence, if producer i seeks to
receive a payment of ai(ω) for a realization of ω, it must pay
in advance:
piai =
∫
Ω
µ(ω)ai(ω)dω (13)
where Ω is the space of all possible outcomes of random ω. If
ai(ω) ≤ 0, then producer i sells ADS (i.e. provides security to
the system) and receives the payment of piai ≤ 0. Otherwise,
if ai(ω) ≥ 0, producer i purchases ADS and pays piai ≥ 0.
Further, the market trading ADS must ensure that the amount
of securities purchased and sold match, i.e. risk trading must
be revenue adequate:∑
i∈G
ai(ω) = 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω (14)
Given the risk trading model in (13) and (14), each profit-
maximizing producer can be modeled as follows:
max
pG,i,αi
λipG,i + χ
>αi − ti − piai (15a)
s.t. (3b)–(3d) (15b)
(ηi,k) : ti ≥ EPk [ci(pG,i(ω))]− EPk [ai(ω)], ∀Pk ∈ Di.
(15c)
where piai reflects the additional cost or revenue due to risk
trading, as given in (13), and EPk [ai(ω)] in (15c) is the
expected ADS cost or revenue over probability measure Pk.
Given (14) and (15), extending the risk-averse market-clearing
in (12) with risk trading yields:
min
pG,i,αi,ai(ω)
spG,i ,ti
∑
i∈G
(ci(pG,i) + ti) (16a)
s.t. (3b)–(3g) and (15c) (16b)
(µ(ω)) :
∑
i∈G
ai(ω) = 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω, (16c)
where (16c) enforces the market-clearing condition in (14),
yielding dual multiplier µ(ω). Using (16) and under the
assumption that set F is sufficiently large to accommodate
injections pG(ω), pU (ω), pD without causing network con-
gestion1 (i.e. energy prices are uniform λ = λi), we prove:
Proposition 1. Let λ∗, χ∗, and µ∗(ω) be equilibrium
energy, balancing, and risk prices, respectively, so that
{λ∗;χ∗u;µ∗(ω); p∗G,i,∀i ∈ G;α∗i ,∀i ∈ G; a∗i (ω),∀i ∈ G}
solves (16). Then µ∗(ω) can be interpreted as a probability
measure that solves the risk-neutral profit maximization equiv-
alent of the risk-averse profit maximization with ADS trading.
Proof. The market-clearing problem in (16) is convex as long
as ai(ω) is convex in ω. Therefore, KKT conditions can be
invoked. The Lagrangian function of the profit maximization
of each producer in (15) can be written as:
Li = λpG,i + χ>αi − ti − piai
−
K∑
k=1
ηi,k(EPk [ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)]− ti)
− δ+i (pG,i + zspG,i − pG,i) (17)
− δ−i (−pG,i + zspG,i + pG,i)
− ζi(
∥∥∥α>i Σ1/2∥∥∥
2
− spG,i).
Hence, the resulting optimality conditions for ti and ai(ω) are
∂Li
∂ti
= −1 +
K∑
k=1
ηi,k = 0 ⇒
K∑
k=1
ηi,k = 1 (18)
∂Li
∂ai(ω)
= −µ(ω) +
K∑
k=1
ηi,kf(ω, σk) = 0
⇒ µ(ω) =
K∑
k=1
ηi,kf(ω,Σk),
(19)
where f(ω,Σk) denotes the probability density function of
a multivariate, zero-mean normal distribution with covariance
matrix Σk. Note that for the derivation of (19) we used the
1This assumption simplifies derivations. Subsequent results can be gener-
alized for the congested case by pricing transmission assets, [28].
following two standard functional derivatives, [29]:
∂piai
ai(ω)
=
∂
ai(ω)
∫
Ω
µ(ω)ai(ω)dω = µ(ω), (20)
∂
ai(ω)
EPk [ai(ω)]=
∂
ai(ω)
∫
Ω
ai(ω)f(ω,Σk)dω =f(ω,Σk).
(21)
Conditions (18) and (19) lead to two relevant observations:
(O1) Dual multiplier µ(ω) in (16c) is a probability measure
as it is the weighted average of K probability den-
sity functions with zero means and covariance matrices
Σ1, ...,Σk. In other words, random Z(ω) ∼ µ(ω) has
the expected value of Eµ[Z(ω)] = 0 and the variance of
Varµ[Z(ω)] =
∑K
k=1 ηi,kΣk.
(O2) Since S˜i is a convex set, condition (18) ensures that∑K
i=1 ηi,kΣk ∈ S˜i and thus µ(ω) ∈ D˜i.
The set of optimal decisions {λ∗;χ∗u;µ∗(ω); p∗G,i,∀i ∈
G;α∗i ,∀i ∈ G; a∗i (ω),∀i ∈ G} maximize Li given in (17).
Note that the fifth term in (17) can be recast using observation
O1 above as:
K∑
k=1
ηi,k(EPk [ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)])
=
K∑
k=1
ηi,k
∫
Ω
[ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)]f(ω,Σk)dω
=
∫
Ω
[ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)]
K∑
k=1
ηi,kf(ω,Σk)dω (22)
=
∫
Ω
[ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)]µ(ω)dω
= Eµ[ci(pG,i(ω))]− piai .
Substituting (22) in (17) leads to:
Li = pG,i + χαi − Eµ[ci(pG,i(ω))]− yδi , (23)
where yδi denotes the last three terms in (17). Hence, (23) is
a risk-neutral equivalent, evaluated with respect to probability
measure µ(ω), of the risk-averse profit of producer i partici-
pating in risk trading with ADS. 
Given Proposition 1, the optimization of individual produc-
ers in (15) is related to the risk-averse chance-constrained
electricity market with ADS trading in (16):
Proposition 2. Let λ∗, χ∗u, and µ∗(ω) be equilibrium energy,
balancing, and risk prices so that {λ∗;χ∗u;µ∗(ω); p∗G,i,∀i ∈
G;α∗i ,∀i ∈ G; a∗i (ω),∀i ∈ G} solves problem (16). Assuming
that risk sets D˜i, i ∈ G are non-disjoint, i.e.
⋂
i∈G D˜i 6= ∅,
then these prices and allocations solve the risk-averse chance-
constrained market with risk trading with D˜0 =
⋂
i∈G D˜i and
worst case probability measure µ(ω).
Proof. Given the optimal solution for each producer, it follows
from the complementary slackness of (15c):
ηi,k(EPk [ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)]− ti) = 0. (24)
Using (14), (22) and (24), we write:∑
i∈G
ti =
∑
i∈G
K∑
k=1
ηi,k(EPk [ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)]
= Eµ
[∑
i∈G
ci(pG,i(ω)
]
, (25)
Also, since (15c) is a convex epigraph, it follows:
ti = maxP∈Di
EPk [ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)]
= max
P∈D˜i
EPk [ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)].
(26)
Given (26), term
∑
i∈G ti in (25) can also be written as:∑
i∈G
ti =
∑
i∈G
max
Pk∈D˜i
EPk [ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)]
A
≥ max
P∈⋂i∈G D˜i EP
[∑
i∈G
ci(pG,i(ω))− ai(ω)
]
(27)
B
= max
P∈⋂i∈G D˜i EP
[∑
i∈G
ci(pG,i(ω))
]
,
where transition A is due to the replacement of individual risk
sets Di with the intersection of all risk sets D˜0 =
⋂
i∈G D˜i and
transition B is due to the market-clearing ADS condition in
(14). Since µ(ω) ∈ D˜i,∀i ∈ G and D˜0 6= ∅, due to observation
O2 above, (25) and (27) yield
Eµ
[∑
i∈G
ci(pG,i(ω))
]
= max
Pk∈D˜0
EPk
[∑
i∈G
ci(pG,i(ω))
]
, (28)
showing that µ(ω) is the worst-case probability measure for
the risk-averse chance-constrained market with risk trading.

Remark 3. Propositions 1 and 2 hold if (16) has binding
constraints in (3e) and can be proven analogously.
B. Discrete Risk Trading
Recall that Section IV-A defines ADS contracts as continuous
over ω, which leads to an infinite-dimensional problem in
(16). On the other hand, a more practical and computationally
tractable approach would be to discretize the probability space
of ω and consider contracts for discrete outcomes. Hence,
consider the system-wide (aggregated) RES forecast error
given as O = e>ω with mean EPk [O] = 0 and variance
VarPk [O] = e
>Σke =: σ2k, where e is the vector of ones
of appropriate dimensions. The probability space of O can
then be divided into W events w = 1, ...,W , where each
event is a closed interval given by Ww = [lw, uw] so that⋃W
w=1Ww = R. These intervals are sequential such that
l1 = −∞, uW =∞ and uw = lw+1, w = 1, ...,W−1. Using
this discretization, the probability of each discrete outcome is
defined from the underlying probability density function as:
Pw(σk) := Pk[O ∈ Ww] = Pk[(O ≤ uw) ∩ (O ≥ lw)]
=
∫ uw
lw
f(x, σk)dx
(29)
and can be pre-computed for all w = 1, ...,W and k =
1, ...,K. Using the discrete space notation, (13) recasts as:
piai =
W∑
w=1
µwai,w, (30)
where ai,w ∈ R. Next, using (29), the expected cost or
payment ai(ω) under Pk can be computed as:
EPk [ai(ω)] =
W∑
w=1
ai,wPw(σk). (31)
Finally, using (30) and (31) and the optimality condition for
ai,w, the discrete-space equivalent of µ(ω) is computed as:
µw =
K∑
k=1
ηkPw(σk) =
K∑
k=1
ηi,k
∫ uw
lw
f(x, σi,k)dx
=
∫ uw
lw
K∑
k=1
ηi,kf(x, σi,k)dx, ∀i
(32)
where σi,k =
∥∥∥e>Σ1/2k ∥∥∥
2
with Σk ∈ Si. Hence, due to
(32), µw retains the interpretation of µ(ω) from observa-
tion O1 of Proposition 1. Indeed, a random variable with
probability density function
∑K
k=1 ηi,kf(x, σi,k) has vari-
ance
∥∥∥e>(∑Kk=1 ηi,kΣk)1/2∥∥∥2
2
= e>(
∑K
k=1 ηkΣk)e, it follows
that Varµ(O) = e>(
∑K
k=1 ηi,kΣk)e. Using this result and
(29)–(32), a discrete modification of the risk-averse chance-
constrained electricity market with risk trading in (16) is:
min
pG,i,αi,ai,w
spG,i ,ti
∑
i∈G
(ci(pG,i) + ti) (33a)
s.t. (3b)–(3g) (33b)
(ηi,k) : ti≥ c2i
∥∥∥α>i Σ1/2k ∥∥∥2
2
+
W∑
w=1
ai,wPw
(∥∥∥e>Σ1/2k ∥∥∥
2
)
,
∀Σk ∈ Si, ∀i (33c)
(µw) :
∑
i∈G
ai,w = 0, ∀w = 1, ...,W. (33d)
Since the discrete representation of ADS contracts in (33) is a
special case of the infinite-dimensional representation in (16),
the results of Propositions 1 and 2 hold for (33).
C. Price Analysis with Risk Trading
Using the risk-averse chance-constrained electricity market
with discrete risk trading in (33), this section analyzes re-
sulting energy, balancing reserve and risk prices as follows:
Proposition 3. Consider the risk-averse chance-constrained
market with risk trading in (33). Let λi, χu and µw be the
dual multipliers of the active power balance (3f), the reserve
sufficiency constraint (3g) and the ADS market-clearing con-
straint (33d). Then µw is given by (32) and λi, χu are:
λi = 2c2ipG,i + ci1 + (δ
+
i − δ−i ) + ypG,i(θ) (34)
χu=
1
|G|
∑
i∈G
(
2c2iα
>
i [Σi]u+z1−gδi
α>i [Σ]u
sG,i
+yαi,u(θ)
)
, (35)
where ypG,i(θ) := θ
> ∂F˜f
∂pG,i
, yαi,u(θ) := θ
> ∂F˜f
∂αi,u
, Σi :=
(
∑K
k=1 ηi,kΣk | Σk ∈ Si), δi := δ+i + δ−i , [X]u is the
vector of elements in the u-th column of matrix X , and
sG,i =
∥∥α>i Σ1/2∥∥2, i.e. the standard deviation of pG,i(ω).
Proof. Let L be the Lagrangian function of (33), its first-order
optimality conditions for pG,i, αi,u, spG,i and ai,w are:
∂L
∂ai,w
=
K∑
k=1
ηi,kPw(σk,i)− µw = 0 (36a)
∂L
∂pG,i
= 2c2ipG,i + ci1 + (δ
+
i − δ−i )
+ ypG,i(θ)− λi = 0, ∀i ∈ G
(36b)
∂L
∂αi,u
= 2c2iα
>
i [Σi]u + ζi
α>i [Σ]u∥∥α>i Σ1/2∥∥2
+ yαi,u(θ)− χu = 0, ∀i ∈ G, ∀u ∈ U
(36c)
∂L
∂spG,i
= −ζi + δ+i z1−g + δ−i z1−g = 0, ∀i ∈ G (36d)
Expressions (32) and (34) follow immediately from (36a) and
(36b), respectively. Expressing ζi from (36d) and summing
over all i ∈ G in (36c) yields (35). 
Notably, energy prices in (34) are driven by cost coefficients
of ci(·) and do not explicitly depend on random ω, risk set
Di and tolerance to chance constraint violations g . On the
other hand, the balancing reserve price in (34) depends on
ω (via parameter Σ), Di (via parameter Σi) and g . Finally,
risk prices in (32) depends on the degree of discretization W ,
which affects interval limits lw and uw, and individual risk
perception given by set Di (via parameter σi,k).
V. CASE STUDY
The case study compares the risk-averse chance-constrained
electricity market without risk trading (NO-RT case) and with
risk trading (RT case) in (12) and (33), respectively. The case
study includes five conventional producers with parameters
reported in Table I and five undispatchable stochastic RES pro-
ducers. The total system demand is
∑
i∈N pD,i = 100 MW,
while each RES producer is forecasted to produce pU,i =
5 MW with the standard deviation of 20% of the forecast
value (1 MW). Each producer has its own set Si = {Σk, k =
1, ..., 10}, which was generated such that (i) each producer has
an unique risk perception and (ii) all producers share at least
one Σk, which is the “true” covariance of ω in our case. We
discretize the probability space of O in eight intervals using
breakpoints [−0.2,−0.1,−0.05, 0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2] as illustrated
in Fig. 1(a). The code and input data is available in [30].
Relative to the NO-RT case, the RT case reduces the
operating cost by 0.2%. Notably, the energy cost (4,656.50 $)
and energy prices (62.09 $) are the same in both cases and
the balancing reserve cost reduces by 11 % (from 6.17 $ to
5.52 $) due to the ADS trading. Since the system-wide ADS
trading is revenue-neutral, i.e.
∑
i∈G piai = 0 as per (14), ADS
contracts do not contribute to the operating cost. On the other
hand, the introduction of ADS trading changes the balancing
reserve provision and its prices, as shown in Table II, which
is influenced by different risk beliefs of market participants.
Fig. 1(b) describes the ADS trading outcomes, where neg-
ative and positive values indicate ADS selling and purchasing
producers. Due to the symmetry of the distribution represent-
ing the RES uncertainty, the ADS trading outcomes are also
symmetric. Further, due to their risk perception given by Si,
producers 1 and 5 are security providers and producers 2-4
are security takers. For example, in the NO-RT case, producer
5 attains more profit by providing less balancing reserve to
TABLE I: Parameters of conventional generators
Prod. i 1 2 3 4 5
c1i [$/MW] 10 7 7 15 17
c2i [$/(MW)2] 1 0.7 0.7 1.5 1.7
pG,i [MW] 30 10 10 25 25
TABLE II: Power Outputs and Balancing Participation Factors
αi,u in the RT case αi,u in the NO-RT case
pG,i u = 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
i = 1 26.04 0.09 0.18 0.26 0.34 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.31 0.24
2 10.00 0.41 0.30 0.40 0.10 0.17 0.39 0.26 0.32 0.10 0.25
3 10.00 0.31 0.28 0.06 0.33 0.31 0.37 0.27 0.12 0.28 0.23
4 15.70 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.26 0.04 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.20
5 13.36 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.08
χu – 1.24 1.54 0.72 0.69 1.31 0.91 1.47 1.31 1.34 1.11
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Fig. 1: Risk trading results in the RT case: (a) itemizes the
event probabilities Pw(σi,k) drawn from all individual risk
sets (shown in thin gray lines) relative to the “true” distribution
(dashed green line) and the ADS prices µw (solid red line); (b)
ADS trades, where negative (purple) values indicate a producer
selling ADS and positive (orange) values indicate a producer
buying ADS.
the RES producer u = 1 than in the RT case. In other words,
when producer 5 can generate additional revenue from ADS
selling, it is incentivized to procure more balancing reserve
for the RES producer u = 1. This risk-averse perception also
affects the ADS prices in Fig. 1(b) given by dual µw of the
ADS market-clearing constraint (14) for each event. As shown
in Fig. 1(a), the values of risk prices µw in Fig. 1(b), match the
“true” event probabilities. That is, µw is indeed a probability
measure, as in Proposition 1, and captures the risk perception
at the intersection of all risk sets D˜i, as in Proposition 2.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has developed a risk-averse modification of the
chance-constrained electricity market proposed in [3]–[5] by
completing it with ADS-based risk trading. By discretizing the
outcome space of the system uncertainty, we formulated prac-
tical ADS contracts that lead to a computationally tractable
market-clearing optimization with risk trading. This optimiza-
tion reduces the system operating cost relative to the case with
no risk trading and produces energy, balancing reserve and risk
prices. In particular, both qualitative and quantitative analyses
indicate that system uncertainty and risk parameters do not
explicitly affect the energy prices, but explicitly contribute to
the formation of the balancing reserve and risk prices.
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